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We propose a dynamic theory of decisions not to choose which of two options is correct. Such 
“don’t-know” judgements are of theoretical and practical importance in domains ranging from 
comparative psychology, psychophysics, episodic memory and metacognition to applied areas 
including educational testing and eyewitness testimony. However, no previous theory has 
provided a detailed quantitative account of the time it takes to make both definitive and don't-
know responses and their relative frequencies. We tested our theory, the “Multiple Threshold 
Race” (MTR), in one recognition memory experiment where participants had to pick a 
previously studied target out of two similar faces and another where targets and lures were tested 
one at a time. In both experiments we manipulated similarity through face morphing. High 
similarity made decisions difficult, encouraging don't-know responses. We also tested the MTR’s 
ability to account for other manipulations that aimed to affect the speed and probability of don't-
know responses, including increasing penalties for making an error (with no penalty for a don't-
know response) and emphasising either response speed or accuracy. We found that there were 
marked individual differences in don't-know use, and that the MTR was able to account for the 
intricate pattern of effects associated with our manipulations, both on average and in terms of 
individual differences. We discuss how estimates of MTR’s parameters illuminate the 
psychological mechanisms that govern the interplay between definitive and don't-know 
responding. 
  









Sometimes it is important to know when you don't know what to choose. For 
example, when faced with a decision based on uncertain information it may be more prudent 
to put off making a definitive choice, and instead collect further information (Busemeyer & 
Rapoport, 1988). In a scenario familiar in game shows where there is a fixed period of time to 
give answers, it can be advantageous to quickly pass on questions to which you think you 
don't know the answer in order to move on to the next question. The scenario that we focus 
on here occurs with a fixed number of uncertain choices between two options where there are 
losses for errors and gains for being correct. As long as it is possible to discern choices where 
accuracy is likely to be low, it can be worthwhile in terms of long-run returns to avoid a 
definitive choice if that also avoids the loss associated with an error. This sort of scenario is 
important in the many real-world situations, ranging from multiple-choice exams with 
formula scoring (where there is a penalty for wrong responses, Higham, 2007), to high-stakes 
decisions in eyewitness line-ups where a false identification can have dire consequences for 
an innocent suspect (Brewer & Wells, 2011). 
The textbook advice in the early psychophysical measurement literature (e.g., 
Woodworth, 1938) was that such “equivocal” choices should not be allowed, both because 
they are made in just the cases where definitive choices are most informative (e.g., Brown, 
1910; Boring, 1921; Jastrow, 1888), and in order to avoid ambiguities in measurements of 
sensitivity caused by large variations in the frequency with which individual participants 
make use of them (e.g., Angell, 1907; Boring, 1920; Fernberger, 1930). The same high 
degree of variability has also been noted in educational testing when a “don't-know” option 
was provided in multiple-choice tests, with a sizeable proportion of participants never using it 
(Friedman & Fleishman, 1956). The rate of don't-know use can also depend heavily on 








prompts; Weber and Perfect (2012) found that in an eyewitness lineup task a spontaneous 
rate of ~2% rate increased ten-fold when an explicit don't-know option was provided.       
In contrast to this early skepticism, Watson, Kellogg, Kawanishi and Lucas (1973) 
concluded that “uncertain” is a meaningful psychophysical response and can be treated as 
equivalent to a middle category between binary choice alternatives in a signal-detection 
theory analysis. They found that individual differences could be accommodated through 
variations in the two thresholds demarcating the three possible responses without 
compromising the measurement of detection sensitivity. Subsequently it was shown that such 
“uncertain” or “escape” responses can be used adaptively to deal with difficult choices not 
only by humans, but also by bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncates; Smith et al., 1995) and 
Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta; Shields, Smith & Washburn, 1997). More recently, Kiani 
and Shadlen (2009) found that in Rhesus monkeys the same neurons in the parietal cortex 
that mediated choices about motion direction also represented the decision to opt out of 
making a choice.  
In the present work we study don't-know responses in recognition-memory tasks. 
Perhaps reflecting early concerns in the psychophysical literature, don't-know responses have 
not been heavily studied in recognition memory (e.g., Clark, Howell & Davey, 2008, report 
their use in only 13 of 94 studies in their meta-analysis of eyewitness identification), but 
more recently their utility has been increasingly acknowledged. For example, in a task 
requiring eyewitness to either identify a suspect or reject the entire line-up, Weber and 
Perfect (2012) found that also providing a don't-know option made definitive responses more 
accurate, more diagnostic of the suspect’s guilt or innocence, and did not decrease the 
quantity of correct decisions. At a theoretical level, Perfect and Weber (2012) extended 
Koriat and Goldsmith’s (1996) influential model of memory monitoring, to model the 








frequency of identify/don't-know/reject lineup decisions using dual-threshold signal-detection 
framework similar to similar to Watson et al. (1973).    
In this paper we propose a new dynamic theory of “don’t-know” responses that 
addresses the speed with which they are made as well as their frequency. We test the theory’s 
ability to cope with the individual differences and the potential ambiguity of don’t-know 
decisions that perturbed the early psychophysicists and its ability to account for several 
experimental manipulations that affect the frequency and speed of responses. Our 
experiments focus on recognition-memory decisions about pictures of faces. The recognition-
memory decisions we examined were difficult because each lure face (i.e., a test face that 
was not studied) was similar to a studied (target) face. We investigated how the effect of 
similarity interacts with the format of the recognition test over two experiments. The first 
experiment used two-alternative forced-choice testing, where the recognition decision was 
between a target and a similar lure appearing side by side. Similarity between test alternatives 
presented in this format is known to induce uncertainty as reflected in confidence ratings 
(Dobbins, Kroll, & Liu, 1998; Heathcote, Bora, & Freeman, 2010; Horry & Brewer, 2016; 
Tulving, 1981), so we hypothesised that it would also affect don’t-know responses. We 
contrasted these results with those from a second experiment where faces were tested one at a 
time, and so variations in lure similarity were less obvious to participants. 
In both experiments we also manipulated payoffs for losses due to error responses 
relative to a fixed gain for correct responses, with neither gains nor losses for don't-know 
responses. If errors are costlier and participants are trying to maximise gains, don’t-know use 
should increase with greater punishments, at least if they feel that they are able to make 
metacognitive judgements that provide valid information about the likely accuracy of their 
choices. Finally, we manipulated the urgency with which participants made recognition 
decisions through instructions that emphasised either the importance of speed or of accuracy. 








If the calibration of metacognitive judgements about the difficulty of choices is degraded by 
having less time available to make a decision, then participants are likely to find it more 
difficult to use don’t-know responses to effectively manage error costs when speed is 
emphasised.  
The key theoretical innovation that we bring to this investigation draws on Vickers’ 
(1979, 2001) dynamic “balance of evidence” model of confidence judgement to create a 
quantitative cognitive model of don’t-know decisions, the Multiple-Threshold Race (MTR). 
Because the MTR models both the frequency of definitive vs. don’t-know decisions and the 
time it takes to make them, it enables us to account for speed vs. accuracy tradeoffs, and to 
use response time (RT) as well as choice proportions to inform our understanding of the 
cognitive processes underlying don’t-know decisions. We instantiate the MTR using Brown 
and Heathcote’s (2008) Linear Ballistic Accumulator (LBA) model of evidence 
accumulation. Pleskac and Busemeyer (2010) note that an accumulator model like the LBA, 
in combination with multiple thresholds (see also Van Zandt & Maldonado-Molina, 2004) 
can avoid pitfalls that have beset prior accumulator models using the balance of evidence, 
such as failing to accommodate the effects of time pressure on confidence. 
Our instantiation of the MTR provides a fine-grained account of performance not only 
in terms of the proportions of correct, error and don’t-know responses, but also the 
distribution of RTs. Further, it supports meaningful parameter estimates because it can be 
used as a measurement model, in the sense that we can recover the parameters used to 
generate simulated data from the MTR (Heathcote, Brown & Wagenmakers, 2015). This one-
to-one mapping between the data and parameters allows us to go beyond checking the 
descriptive adequacy of the MTR to also assess the coherence of the insights its parameter 
estimates provide about the psychological processes underpinning don’t-know decisions. It 








also allows us to investigate individual differences in don’t-know use, which were quite 
marked, in line with the results in the psychophysical and educational-testing literatures.  
In the following we first describe the MTR and the mathematical details that enable 
us to use Bayesian methods to fit it to data and obtain parameter estimates. We then provide 
an overview of the two experiments and discuss how the MTR’s parameters are related to the 
four manipulations we investigate: test format, target-lure similarity, error cost and 
speed/accuracy emphasis. Finally, we report the empirical results for each experiment, test 
the ability of the MTR to describe these results, and investigate the way in which its 
estimated parameters explain both the average effects of the experimental manipulations and 
individual differences. 
The Multiple-Threshold Race 
Standard evidence-accumulation architectures like the LBA map one accumulator to 
each response option, where each accumulator has an associated evidence total that increases 
over time. Each accumulator also has an evidence threshold with magnitude b that may differ 
between accumulators to accommodate response bias. The first accumulator total that reaches 
threshold triggers its corresponding response. RT equals the threshold crossing time plus the 
time for non-decision processes (i.e., encoding the choice stimulus and producing a motor 
response). In past applications, one LBA accumulator has been mapped to each possible 
response (Brown & Heathcote, 2008). Thus, it might seem that the simplest way to model 
binary choice with an additional don’t-know response is with three accumulators. However, 
this approach does not intrinsically capture the fact that, in terms of certainty about decision, 
don’t-know responses fall on a bivalent continuum between each of the definitive binary 
responses (Watson et al., 1973). 








Instead, in the MTR there are only two accumulators, one for each definitive choice, 
but to both we add a second threshold below the first. Vickers (1979) proposed that 
confidence is an increasing function of the magnitude of the difference in the evidence 
between winning and losing accumulators (see also Van Zandt, 2000; Merkle & Van Zandt, 
2006), but later noted that there was a "need to take account of the way in which such 
magnitudes may be converted into overt confidence ratings" (Vickers, 2001, p.153)1. Here we 
use multiple thresholds to convert the balance of evidence into another type of rating 
inversely associated with the confidence, a don't-know response. The idea of multiple 
thresholds in accumulator models has precedent in the work of Van Zandt and Maldonado-
Molina (2004), where it provided a mechanism for making two responses in a sequence.  
We also add a rule that determines the response contingent on the state of the 
evidence totals in both accumulators. We assume that, as in the standard architecture and 
Vicker’s (1979) balance of evidence model, a response is made at a time determined by the 
first accumulator to cross the upper threshold. However, the response chosen only 
corresponds to the definitive choice associated with the winning accumulator if the total in 
the losing accumulator is still below its lower threshold. If the losing accumulator is above its 
lower threshold, then a don’t-know response is made. Intuitively the latter case is more 
uncertain because there is less difference between the evidence totals at the moment of choice 




1 Merkle and Van Zandt (2005) proposed this was done by first calculating a relative balance of evidence score 
on the 0-1 interval (i.e., winning evidence divided by the sum of winning and losing evidence) then directly 
accessing this value to make a mapping to confidence (e.g., the probability of a confidence rating as a 
percentage between 5-15 is the probability of the relative score falling between 0.05 and 0.15). Our proposal 
differs in that the mapping is not direct, but rather is mediated by threshold placement, which gives it greater 
flexibility. Our approach is also consistent with the assumption made by most evidence-accumulation models 
that the only way to access the state of an accumulator is through threshold-crossing events. 








decisions on the difference in evidence between the two accumulators – Vickers’ (1979) 
“balance of evidence” – the MTR captures the intrinsic positioning of don’t-know responses 
between the definitive responses. 
 
 
          (a)          (b)         (c)        (d) 
Figure 1. The for latent states of the MTR don't-know model for a binary left vs. right button-press 
choice. Each of (a)-(d) represent a single decision made by a pair of accumulators (which decision is 
made is indicated above each pair), with time on the x-axis and the evidence total on the y-axis (axes 
are thick solid lines). Linearly increasing evidence totals are represented by slanting dashed lines. 
Horizontal dashed lines represent thresholds. Each accumulator pair is represented at the moment a 
decision occurs and labelled above with the corresponding choice. 
This choice rule means that at the unobserved or “latent” level there are two types of 
don't-know responses, corresponding to the accumulator mapped to one or other option 
winning (i.e., Figures 1b and 1c). However, at the observed or “manifest” level these two 
types cannot be differentiated, whereas the definitive choices remain identifiable. This 
ambiguity around a don’t-know choice might potentially cause measurement issues, a 
question we return to below. We denote the magnitudes of the lower thresholds as d. As d 
becomes smaller the likelihood of a don't-know response increases because the range of 
values of the loosing accumulator corresponding to a don't-know response also increases. 
Furthermore, like the upper thresholds, d may vary between accumulators, modulating the 
proportion of don’t-know responses generated by each latent state. For example, in Figure 1, 








if d were smaller for the left accumulator than for the right accumulator then, all other things 
being equal, don't-know responses are more likely to be generated when the right 
accumulator wins than when the left accumulator wins. As d approaches zero for a given 
accumulator any case in which that accumulator loses must produce a don’t-know response.  
In reporting our results we use a measure defined as DK = (1-d/b), which is the 
proportion of the region below an accumulator’s choice threshold that corresponds to a don't-
know response (i.e., the region between the don't-know threshold, d, and the choice 
threshold, b). When DK = 1 only don’t-know responses can be made, whereas when DK = 0, 
no don’t-know responses can be made. Between these values don’t-know probability 
monotonically increases with DK. 
The MTR model illustrated in Figure 1 shares many assumptions with Brown and 
Heathcote’s (2008) LBA model, which has been shown to give a strong account of data from 
episodic memory paradigms (see Osth, Bora, Dennis, & Heathcote, 2017; Osth & Farrell, 
2019; Rae et al., 2014). One shared assumption is that evidence totals increase linearly during 
a trial. Other possibilities could exist within the general MTR framework, such as racing 
diffusion processes (i.e., processes whose rate varies randomly during each decision). The 
linear deterministic assumption is useful because it makes the MTR model very 
computationally tractable.  
Like the LBA, we assume that the rate varies randomly between trials, following a 
normal distribution, and we assume that distribution is truncated to only include positive 
values so that all accumulators have finite finishing times (see Heathcote & Love, 2012). 
Again, like the LBA, we also assume that the starting-point of evidence accumulation varies 
randomly and independently for each accumulator following a uniform distribution on the 
interval 0-A, where A may vary between accumulators. Start-point variability accounts for 








random trial-to-trial response biases, and in terms of Figure 1, would mean that the slanting 
lines usually start at different points from each other. 
In summary, the MTR model has six types of parameters. Five of these are shared 
with the LBA: non-decision time, t0, the mean rate of evidence accumulation, v, and its 
standard deviation, sv, start-point noise, A, and the upper threshold, b. The MTR adds one 
extra parameter, d, corresponding to a second threshold. In principle all six parameters can 
differ between accumulators, but here we assume this is not the case for t0 and for A without 
any apparent deleterious effects in fitting our data; this may differ in other applications. 
In the fits reported here we enforce the orderings 0 < A < b, by estimating parameters 
A > 0, and B > 0, where B = b – A. The ordering A < b ensures that a decision cannot be made 
instantaneously. To ensure the definitional characteristic of the don’t-know threshold, that it 
lies between zero and the upper or “choice” threshold, we also enforce the ordering 0 < d < b 
by estimating a parameter D on the unit interval (i.e., 0 < D < 1) where D = d/b. This D 
parameter is then transformed using the logistic function so that it could be estimated on the 
real number line. Note that this definition allows that an accumulator may sometimes start in 
a state that can only support a don’t-know response if it loses the race. We examine 
parameter estimates to examine the degree to which this occurs. Although we sample the 
value D, in analysis we are often more interested in 1-D=DK, which gives the proportion of 
the accumulator that results in a don’t know response if accumulation finishes in this region.  
We define differences in rate parameters in terms of the accumulator that matches 
versus mismatches the stimulus. In our first experiment the accumulator corresponding to the 
side on which the target is presented has the matching rate, and the accumulator for the lure 
side has the mismatching rate. In our second experiment, if the stimulus is a target the 
accumulator associated with a target response has the matching rate, and the accumulator 
associated with a lure response has the mismatching rate, and vice versa for a lure stimulus. 








Because a winning matching accumulator produces correct responses, when accuracy is 
greater than chance its mean rate, vc, tends to be greater than the mean rate, ve, for the 
mismatching accumulator that produces errors. We also parameterized the rate standard 
deviation in terms of matching and mismatching accumulators, svc and sve. In at least one 
experimental condition we give sve a fixed value of one in order to make the model 
identifiable (Donkin, Brown & Heathcote, 2009). 
In Appendix A we provide the equations for the likelihoods of each possible response. 
These equations enable us to fit the MTR in a way that simultaneously takes account of all 
aspects of the data under the assumption that the joint distribution of responses and RTs is 
independently and identically distributed within participants and conditions that share the 
same parameters. We use hierarchical Bayesian methods that allow us to take account of 
multiple sources of uncertainty in our parameter estimates and garner constraint from 
commonalities among participants (Shiffrin, Lee, Kim & Wagenmakers, 2008).    
Experiment and Model Overview 
Both recognition-memory experiments required difficult choices, because it is 
unlikely that participants would make don’t-know responses with easy choices. The two 
experiments differed only in the way test lists were constructed and presented, either testing 
recognition using pairs of items (Experiment 1) or using a single item at a time (Experiment 
2). In Experiment 1 participants were tested with a horizontally arrayed pair of colour 
pictures of faces. If they decided to make a definitive response they had to indicate if the 
target was on the left or right. In Experiment 2 the definitive responses classified the single 
test items as a target or as a lure. In both experiments, participants studied lists of pictures of 
faces presented one at a time. The items in the study list were made up of one of the members 
of pairs of faces like those in Figure 2b or 2c. These face pairs were created by morphing 








together pairs of face images chosen to be structurally similar, like the pair shown in Figure 
2a. Note that these original images were never seen by participants. Pairs which were easier 
to discriminate were created by a 90%/10% mixture (e.g., Figure 2b) and pairs that were 
harder to discriminate were created by a 70%/30% mixture. This difference in the levels of 
morphing was chosen through a pilot experiment which confirmed that it was sufficient to 
produce substantially more errors and don't-know responses in single item recognition of 
higher vs. lower similarity lures. Half of the study items came from easy pairs and half from 
hard pairs. For each participant, lower and higher similarity lure items always came from a 
different original pair of faces. 
               
        (a)     (b)          (c) 
Figure 2. (a) Example of paired faces used to construct study and test images with the same resolution 
as in the experiment. (b) a corresponding lower-similarity face pair created by morphing 10% of one 
face with 90% of the other, and (c) a corresponding higher-similarity face pair created by morphing 
30% of one face with 70% of the other. 
In Experiment 1 half of the study items were drawn from lower-similarity pairs and 
half from higher-similarity pairs. All study items were tested, half with the target on the left 
and half with the target on the right, with the lure being the other member of the pair that was 
not studied. In Experiment 2 the study list was constructed in the same way, and half of its 
members were randomly selected to be test targets with equal numbers drawn from lower- 
and higher-similarity pairs. The other half of the test faces were lures drawn from pairs where 
the other member had been studied but was not tested, again with equal numbers from lower- 
and higher-similarity pairs. As a result, one quarter of the test trials used lower-similarity 








lures and one quarter higher-similarity lures. In summary, Experiment 1 had a test stimulus 
factor with two levels corresponding to lower-similarity vs. higher-similarity pairs, that 
occurred equally often. In Experiment 2 the stimulus factor had lower-similarity lure, higher-
similarity lure and target levels, occurring, respectively, on 25%, 25% and 50% of test trials. 
This design ensured that face identity is not confounded with lower- vs. higher-
similarity lures (i.e., there were no systematic item differences) because the same originals 
were drawn on to generate both hard and easy pairs. To avoid priming due to repeated 
presentation of items derived from the same original faces only one of the hard or easy pairs 
derived from the same originals were seen by a given participant. In Experiment 2 the targets 
that made up the remaining half of the test list were homogenous in terms of similarity 
because faces drawn from lower- and higher-similarity pairs were no more or less similar to 
other studied faces. 
Both experiments included two factors that attempted to manipulate don’t-know 
thresholds, one between subjects, error cost, and one within subjects, speed vs. accuracy 
emphasis, that are described in detail in the next two sections. A third within-subjects factor 
that attempted to manipulate choice difficulty, the similarity of lures to targets, differed in 
how it was instantiated in each experiment, and is described in the third section below. We 
hypothesised participants would be less likely to make don’t-know responses for easier 
choices, reflecting their greater certainty. This type of difference in don’t-know probability 
provides a stringent test of the model because, as we argue below and instantiate in our 
modelling, it must be explained without any difference in don’t-know thresholds. 
Error Cost 
Participants might use information available before a trial to adjust the don't-know 
threshold, and hence the proportion of don't-know responses, in a way that can help to 








achieve performance goals. In an attempt to manipulate such goals, we provided participants 
in both experiments with feedback based on a scoring system much like that used for 
formula-scored multiple-choice tests. Error cost was manipulated between subjects in order 
to avoid carry-over effects and so maximize any observed differences. In all cases correct 
responses received +100 points and no points were awarded or lost for a don’t-know 
response. 
The high-error-cost condition encouraged the use of don't-know responses by 
penalizing errors (-300 points) more heavily than it rewarded correct responses. In this case 
the optimal strategy is to respond don't-know whenever a response had less than a 75% 
expected chance of being correct. This is because, at 75% correct, the expected return is zero 
(i.e., 0.75´100+0.25´–300=0); for higher accuracies the return is positive, making  it better to 
make a definitive response; for lower accuracies the return is negative, making it better to 
respond don’t know to obtain a sure zero return. 
The low-error-cost condition penalized errors less than the high-error-cost condition 
(-100 points). In this case it is optimal to use a don't-know response when expected accuracy 
is less than 50%, as at that level the expected return is zero (i.e., 0.50´100+0.50´–100=0). 
This is very unlikely, as 50% represents chance performance in a binary choice task. 
Although less than chance responding is possible for high-similarity lures, it would be 
circular to assume that participants can set thresholds differently for lure and target stimuli to 
take advantage of this occurring. Additionally, even if one could recognise that a particularly 
definitive response has less than 50% accuracy, it would be better to swap that response for 
the alternative definitive response than to make a don’t-know response. 
Hence, if participants are entirely governed by optimizing points, they have no reason 
to ever use don't-know responses in the low error-cost condition, and so should set the don't-








know threshold equal to the upper threshold (i.e., d = b and so DK = 0). In the high error-cost 
condition, they should set the don't-know threshold at a lower level (i.e., d < b and so DK > 
0). 
However, it is possible that participants may, at least in part, set their don't-know 
threshold in order to optimize an alternative criterion. For example, if they wanted to increase 
the accuracy of their definitive responses, they would lower their don't-know threshold, and 
so both increase the probability of making a don’t know response and the probability that 
definitive responses are accurate, at least to the degree that the balance of evidence provided 
them with valid information about accuracy. This would encourage increased don't-know 
responding even in the low error-cost condition. Also, they could set the criterion so as to 
maximize the expected utility of their responses rather than the expected value. For example, 
if utility reflected a loss aversion, the magnitude of the utility increase for a gain of +100 
points could be less than the disutility of a loss of -100 points, again encouraging don't-know 
responses in the low error-cost condition. 
In Experiment 2 it might also be advantageous to have different don’t-know 
thresholds for each accumulator, as target-stimulus trials will typically have higher quality 
evidence (i.e., a larger difference between the matching and mismatching accumulator rates) 
than lure trials, due to the inclusion of lures that are highly similar to targets. Hence, relative 
to lure trials, target trials are likely to have more correct responses, and the lure accumulator 
will, on average, have less evidence at the time of a correct choice. This means that a 
participant can afford to set a lower don’t-know threshold for the lure accumulator, so that 
trials when the stimulus is a target and a target response is made are unlikely to trigger a 
don’t-know response. Conversely, when the stimulus is a lure with a lower evidence quality, 
false target responses are more likely to become don’t-know responses if the lure 
accumulator’s don’t-know threshold is lower. As the advantage of replacing wrong definitive 








responses with don’t-know responses varies with error cost, we allowed for asymmetries in 
don’t-know thresholds that vary with error cost. 
In Experiment 1 choices do not directly correspond to whether a stimulus is a lure or 
target, but rather whether it is more likely the target is on the left or right of the test pair. 
Hence, there is no basis to set don’t know thresholds differently for each accumulator. 
However, it is still possible that participants have a capricious preference for one side or the 
other, so we accommodated that possibility by also allowing different don’t-know thresholds 
for each accumulator that again could vary with error cost. As is conventional in evidence-
accumulation modelling, preferences for either response (i.e., left vs. right in Experiment 1 
and target vs. lure in Experiment 2) were also accommodated by allowing different choice 
thresholds for each accumulator, and again we allowed these to vary over error-cost 
conditions. 
Speed vs. Accuracy Emphasis 
In both experiments we manipulated instructions that emphasised either the speed or 
accuracy of responding. These instructions were manipulated in a blocked manner (i.e., 
between lists) in order to make it easier for participants to follow them. We used a speed-
accuracy manipulation to study how it affects the frequency and speed of don’t-know 
responses. As accuracy emphasis instructions pertain to definitive responses, participants 
may be more likely to try to use don’t-know responses to improve definitive-response 
accuracy under accuracy emphasis. As previously discussed, this may occur even in the low 
error-cost condition that does not reward making don’t-know responses. Effects on response 
frequency may also arise if definitive responses and don’t-know responses differ in speed; if 
don't-know responses are faster, they may be favoured under speed emphasis; if they are 
slower, they may be favoured under accuracy emphasis. In light of these considerations we 








allowed choice and don’t-know thresholds to vary freely between speed and accuracy 
conditions. 
The speed vs. accuracy manipulation produces a benchmark effect on speed for 
evidence-accumulation models of binary choice: errors that are slower than correct responses 
under accuracy emphasis and errors that are as fast or faster than correct responses under 
speed emphasis (e.g., Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998). It was originally thought that speed-accuracy 
emphasis selectively influenced thresholds, reducing them under speed emphasis. Reduced 
thresholds both speeds responding (because it takes less time to accumulate enough evidence 
to reach a lower threshold) and reduces accuracy (because shorter accumulation increases 
noise from factors like random biases present at the start of accumulation). However, there is 
now a consensus that rates can also be affected (e.g., Rae, Heathcote, Donkin & Brown, 
2014), at least when the speed-accuracy manipulation is sufficiently potent (Starns, Ratcliff 
& McKoon, 2012). In accumulator models like the LBA the rate effect generally takes the 
form of speed emphasis increasing both the match and mismatch rates, which speeds 
responding, but decreasing the difference between them, which decreases accuracy. Given 
these results, in our fits of the MTR model we allowed mean rates to vary with speed-
accuracy emphasis in both experiments. 
Similarity and Test Format. 
Previous research indicates that when two similar recognition test items are presented 
side by side, participants can, at least to some degree, discount common features, protecting 
them, at least to some degree, against the reduction in accuracy caused by interference due to 
similarity (Wixted & Mickes, 2014). Hence, it is likely that the effect of the similarity 
manipulation will be weaker in Experiment 1, where target and lure are presented side by 
side, than in Experiment 2, where only one test item is presented at a time and so there is no 








clear way for participants to identify which are the best features to discount. In the MTR, as 
in the LBA, accuracy is largely determined by the size of the advantage of the rate of the 
matching (vc) over the mismatching (ve) accumulator. Hence it is likely that this rate 
difference (i.e., vc–ve) between high and low similarity conditions will be attenuated in 
Experiment 1 relative to the difference in vc–ve for high vs. low similarity lures in Experiment 
2. Such differences in rates are allowed as we fit each experiment separately. In Experiment 1 
we freely estimated separate matching and mismatching rates for high and low similarity 
pairs.  In Experiment 2 we freely estimated separate matching and mismatching rates for 
targets and high and low similarity lures. 
Because they so strongly resemble targets, accuracy for high similarity lures can 
potentially be systematically below chance, at least for some participants, and particularly in 
Experiment 2. The MTR can accommodate this possibility by allowing estimates of vc < ve. 
Even when accuracy is above chance, vc > ve may not hold for one of the two stimuli when 
there is a sufficiently strong response bias for that stimulus (i.e., a lower value of b for the 
corresponding accumulator), because an accumulator with a slower rate can win if it has to 
travel less distance to reach its threshold. All of these possibilities were accommodated in 
Experiment 2 by estimating different values of vc and ve for targets, high similarity lures and 
low similarity lures. In Experiment 1 vc is the rate for the accumulator corresponding to the 
side on which the target was presented and ve the accumulator corresponding to the side on 
which the lure was presented. Different values of ve were estimated for low and high 
similarity lures, and different values of vc for targets that accompanied high and low 
similarity lures. 
In evidence-accumulation models it is assumed that thresholds cannot be changed 
based on stimulus properties about which a decision is being made. To assume otherwise 
would be circular, as that would require knowledge of the thing which is being decided on 








each trial. Hence, we make the same assumption for don’t-know thresholds. This has the 
implication that all thresholds must be the same for targets, lower similarity lures and higher 
similarity lures in Experiment 2. This selective-influence assumption, which means that only 
rate parameters vary over the stimulus factor provides a strong test of the MTR because it 
must account for effects of similarity on don't-know responding without any change in don't-
know thresholds. 
Individual Differences 
In both experiments we found very large individual differences in don't-know use, 
with some participants being very resistant to making don't-know responses even in the high 
error-cost condition. This was the case despite instructions that clearly outlined their potential 
benefits and demonstrations that they in fact often did not know the right answer because 
their recognition performance was very error prone due of the difficult nature of the choice. 
These individual differences present a challenge because they necessarily reduce the 
reliability of differences between low and high error-cost groups. However, they also 
represent an opportunity, because they provide both a test of the MTR model’s ability to fit 
this variation between individuals and psychological insights into the causes of these 
differences in terms of relationships among MTR parameter estimates. 
In order to realize this opportunity, we report not only the fit of the model to group-
averaged data, but also its fit to data at the level of individual participants. Because the 
probability of making don’t-know responses increases with the MTR’s DK parameter for 
each accumulator we examined the relationship between the average value DK over 
accumulators and individual differences in making don’t-know responses. However, it is 
important to note that other model parameters also affect the probability of making don’t-








know responses, with the degree of divergence between individual DK estimates and don’t 




In total 43 subject participated. All attended a one-hour session and were University 
of Tasmania students with ages in years ranged from 17 to 62. Psychology students received 
course credit for participation, and students from other faculties was compensated for 
expenses in attending with a $20 shopping voucher. All participants provided prior informed 
consent to participate and to publicly disseminate their de-identified data. All aspects of the 
study relevant to participation were approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human 
Research Ethics Committee (Ref No. H0012660) 
The participants were randomly assigned to the error-cost condition, resulting in 23 
with high error-cost and 20 with low error-cost. Participants were run in groups ranging from 
1 to 4 in size. All participants provided prior informed consent to participate and to publicly 
disseminate their de-identified data. 
Stimuli 
The stimulus pool was comprised of digitally stored colour photographs of faces 
retrieved from several internet databases. The faces were of adults approximately equally 
sampled from both sexes, representing a variety of ages and cultures but predominantly 
young adults of seemingly Anglo-European backgrounds. The images included all of a 
person’s hair (where present) and ears (where visible) but were cropped as much as possible 








about the chin-line, excluding the neck and shoulders. No faces bore facial hair or glasses, 
and any distinguishing features (e.g., birthmarks, earrings) were removed. 
In order to render two levels of recognition difficulty, 336 pairs of faces were 
subjectively matched on the basis of similar face shape, hairstyle and hair colour. Then, each 
face was digitally morphed (using FantaMorph 5 software from Abrosoft) as depicted in 
Figure 2. In this way, each item in the 672-item stimulus pool was paired with a face from 
which it could be discriminated with more or less difficulty. 
Procedure 
After introductory verbal and on-screen instructions, the sessions were composed of 
two sets of six study-test cycles, each preceded by a practice cycle, and each of which lasted 
about 15 minutes. These sets were differentiated only with respect to the speed or accuracy 
instruction that preceded them and were separated by a self-paced break. For speed-stress, 
participants were instructed to try to respond as quickly as possible on the basis of the first 
decision they could make with any degree of accuracy. For accuracy-stress, participants were 
instructed to use as much of the available time as necessary to ensure they made a response 
that was as accurate as possible. An icon was permanently displayed in the top-left corner of 
the screen, indicating whether the cycle required emphasis on speed or accuracy. Participants 
were also instructed to try to maximize their tally of points, and it was emphasised that the 
don't-know response option should be used in order to achieve this objective. 
Introductory screen instructions preceded each cycle that reminded participants to be 
ready to respond, with their fingers on the appropriate response-keys. The onset of each cycle 
was initiated by the participant by pressing any keyboard button. The study phase of each 
cycle involved presentation of 28 faces. Presentation commenced with a central fixation point 
for 0.5s, and then each face, in the centre of the screen, for 1s, separated by a blank inter-








stimulus interval of 0.5s. The test phase commenced 1s after the last study face. Test stimuli 
for each cycle were constituted of 25 targets – 12 from high-similarity pairs and 12 from low-
similarity pairs – paired with corresponding lures; 24 targets were drawn from the central 24 
study items and one from the remainder. The middle items were selected to minimize 
variation due to study-order primacy and recency effects. Responses to the single item drawn 
from the first- and last-two studied items were not analysed for the same reason, with this 
item included in the test list so that participants were less likely to be aware of the exclusion 
of primacy and recency items. The location of targets in pairs, and the order in which pairs 
were tested, was randomized. Participants pressed the “z” key to indicate that the left face 
was the target and the “/” key to indicate the right face was the target or the space-bar key to 
indicate a don’t-know response. 
Test trials commenced with a central fixation point for 1s, followed by a test stimulus 
for a maximum of 2.5s, accuracy feedback for 1s, and a blank interval for 0.5s. The test item 
was immediately offset upon registration of a response. Accuracy feedback was in the form 
of centrally presented text-string that showed the amount gained (100) if correct, lost (-100 
or -300) if incorrect, or the word “skipped” if the don't-know response had been used. 
Alternatively, a “too slow” message was presented in the case of a response timeout. After a 
short interval this string quickly moved up to the top-right of the screen where its value 
updated the tally. This tally then momentarily flickered so as to draw attention to the updated 
value. Any points already acquired could be preserved, but none were gained, by a don't-
know response. The numerical tally of points was permanently displayed in the top-right 
corner of the screen during the test phase. In order to avoid loss of motivation, the tally could 
not decrease below zero, such that errors incurred at this point were not costly. 








The stimulus faces were presented against a constant grey-and-white patterned 
background that differed between study and test phases so as to encourage face recognition 
rather than picture recognition. The background measured 15 cm ´ 12 cm. Responses were 
made using either the “z” or “/” keys on a computer keyboard for yes or no responses, with 
this attribution alternated in the order participants were tested, and the space bar for don't-
know responses. Participants were free to use either the index or middle fingers of each hand 
for the “z” or “/” keys, and thumbs for the space-bar, and were instructed to keep these 
fingers in place upon the keyboard at all times, and so to be equally prepared to execute a 
response from any of the alternatives as appropriate. A graphical reminder of this mapping 
was permanently displayed at the bottom of the screen throughout the run. 
Results 
We first analysed definitive responses, both in terms of their accuracy and mean RT, 
then examined the probability of making don't-know response and compared don't-know 
mean RT to that of definitive responses. Analyses were conducted with the lme4 R package 
(Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014), using a Gaussian error model for the logarithm 
of RT and a binomial probit model for the binary choice data. ANOVA inferences were made 
via Wald χ2 tests with type III sums of squares as implemented by the car package (Fox et al., 
2012) and we judge significance at a p < .01 criterion. 
Subsequently we report parameter estimates for MTR fit separately to the high and 
low-error-cost conditions. Credible intervals (e.g., ranges in which 95% of the posterior 
parameter estimates fall) and corresponding probabilities used for inference when comparing 
parameters (e.g., the probability that a difference in parameters is greater than zero) were 
calculated based on the proportions of posterior parameter samples averaged over participants 
for each MCMC iteration. The model had 19 parameters in total, with this number (being 








only a little more than one per accumulator for each cell of the 8 within-subject experimental 
conditions), being necessary to accommodate the complex design. There were four don’t-
know (d) and four choice (b) parameters, one for the left and one for the right accumulator 
separately for the speed and accuracy conditions. There was one start-point noise (A), one 
non-decision time (t0) and one rate standard deviation (sv) parameter for the matching 
accumulator for all conditions. The sv parameter for the mismatching accumulator was fixed 
at one to make the model identifiable2. There were eight mean rate parameters, half for the 
matching accumulator and half for the mismatching accumulator, with different values for 
lower- and higher-similarity pairs in the speed and accuracy conditions. For details of 
sampling methods and priors see supplementary materials. Data files and Dynamic Models of 
Choice (Heathcote et al., 2018) R code to fit the models are available at osf.io/6h4qe/ 
Rather than report every detail of a rather complicated design, we graph the 
substantial effects (as confirmed by ANOVA inference) in mean RT and response 
probability. On each graph we also plot the corresponding effects for the fitted model. In 
supplementary materials we plot the global fit of the model to all conditions, both in terms of 
RT distribution (as represented by the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles) and response 
probability; the global account provided by model is quite good in all conditions. To further 
illustrate that the model provides an accurate account of the full distribution of RT, observed 
and fitted cumulative density functions are also provided in supplementary materials.  
To set the scene in terms of the individual differences in don’t-know use (from 




2 Heathcote and Love (2012) showed that allowing for a difference in sv between matching and mismatching 
accumulators clearly improved the fit of the LBA and allowed it to better account for differences in the speed 
of correct and error responses. The same was true in the fits reported here.  








and 3b plot observed against fitted don't-know probabilities for each participant separately for 
the high and low error-cost conditions. Comparison of the two panels shows that don't-know 
use was greater when error cost was higher, as expected (see also Figures 4a and 4b). There 
was also tendency for don't-know use to be more frequent when the target was on the right 
(black symbols) than on the left (grey symbols). Figures 3c and 3d plot the right-left 
differences, which in some cases were as much as 15%, although for a minority of 
participants this was reversed by as much as 10%, further underlining the marked extent of 
individual variation. Again, the model provides a good account of this effect, although with a 
few outlying participants, such as “t” for high error cost and “M” for low error cost. 
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   (c)      (d) 
Figure 3. (a) and (b): Observed vs. fitted don't-know probability for left targets (grey letters) 
and right targets (black letters). Letters correspond to participants: a ... w for the 23 
participants in the high error-cost condition and A … T for the 20 participants in the low 
error cost-condition. (c) and (d) observed and fitted differences between right and left target 
results. 
Figure 4a shows the higher average don't-know probability for right targets, c2(1) = 
12.5, p < .001. The only other significant effect on don't-know probability was an interaction 
between similarity and error cost. As shown in Figure 4b and 4c, don't-know responses were 
more common with higher than lower error cost, and the difference was larger for lower than 
higher similarity pairs, c2(1) = 7.8, p = .005.  Figure 4b and 4c also show an advantage in 
accuracy of definitive responses for left targets (78.4%) over right targets (72.8%), c2(1) = 
299, p < .001. Figure 4d shows the only other significant effect on the proportion of correct 
definitive response, a small but consistent advantage for the accuracy-stress condition 
(76.3%) over the speed-stress condition (75.2%), c2(1) = 12.5, p < .001. It also shows that 
that there was no evidence for an effect of speed vs. accuracy emphasis on don't-know use. 
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      (d) 
Figure 4. Response probability for data (open symbols with 95% confidence intervals) and 
fits (closed symbols joined by lines) as a function of response probability for: (a) left and 
right targets; lower and higher similarity pairs in (b) low and (c) high error cost and (d) speed 
vs. accuracy emphasis. 
 
      (a)             (b) 
Figure 5. Mean RT for data (open symbols with 95% confidence intervals) and fits (closed 
symbols joined by lines) as a function of response broken down by speed vs. accuracy 
emphasis in the (a) low error-cost and (b) high error-cost conditions. 









Although speed vs. accuracy emphasis had only a small effect on response 
probability, Figure 5 shows that it had a large overall effect on RT, c2(1) = 1535, p < .001, 
that was generally larger for high than low error cost, c2(1) = 21.4, p < .001.  The speed vs. 
accuracy effect also interacted with response, c2(1) = 30.8, p < .001, with the largest 
difference for don't-know followed by right then left responses. As can be seen by comparing 
Figures 5a and 5b this interaction varied with error cost, c2(1) = 15.4, p < .001, with the 
difference in don't-know largest for low error cost (~ .2s) but smallest for high error cost 
(~.16s), whereas left and right response differences were smallest for low error cost (~ .12s) 
and largest for high error cost (~.2s). Overall, right responses (~1.15s) were slower than left 
and don't-know responses (~1.1s), c2(1) = 57.6, p < .001. Responses to left targets (~1.1s) 
were slightly faster than to right targets (~1.125s), c2(1) = 6.7, p < .01, and this effect 
interacted and response, ), c2(1) = 30.7, p < .001, with the largest difference in definitive 
responses (~.2s) and virtually no difference for don't-know responses. No other effects were 
significant. 
Model Parameters 
In this section we focus on the model parameters of most interest, mean rates (v), 
choice thresholds (b) and DK. Results for the remaining parameters (i.e., non-decision time, 
t0, start-point variability, A, and rate variability, sv) are presented in supplementary materials.  
Figure 6a and 6b shows the relationship between the probability of a don’t-know 
response and DK parameter estimates. As we cannot distinguish don't-know responses 
corresponding to DK values for the left and right accumulators we averaged them in the plot. 
The figure shows a very strong linear relationship between the average DK and don't-know 
probability, which does not differ for speed and accuracy conditions, but which is slightly 








steeper for low error cost (slope = 2.02, r2 = .992 p < .001) than high error cost (slope = 1.84, 
r2 = .993, p < .001). The corresponding regression lines, assuming a zero intercept, are 
superimposed on the scatter plots in Figure 6a and 6b. Although the relationship cannot 
continue to be linear for larger values of DK (as DK is bounded above by one) these results 
do show that there is a very tight relationship between DK estimates and don't-know use.  
We reasoned that the difference in don't-know use for left and right targets might, at 
least in part, be mediated by the difference in DK for left and right accumulators. As the left 
accumulator would most often win for left targets DK for the right accumulator would mostly 
determine the frequency of don’t-know responses, and vice versa for right targets, the 
relationship would be expected to be negative. As shown in Figures 6c and 6d this 
expectation was borne out, with a stronger relationship for high cost (slope = -0.28, r2=.33, p 
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   (c)      (d) 
Figure 6.  (a) and (b): Observed probability of don't-know responses for speed (grey letters) 
and accuracy (black letters) as a function of the average of DK estimates over left and right 
accumulators. (c) and (d): Observed probability of the different between DK responses for 
left and right targets as a function of the difference in DK estimates between right and left 
accumulators. Letters a ... w correspond to the 23 participants in the high error cost-condition 
and A … T to the 20 participants in the low error-cost condition. 
 
Figure 7a and 7b show average DK estimates, which were clearly larger for high than 
low error cost (ps < .001), consistent with more frequent don’t-know responses in the former 
condition. DK estimates were also larger and for the left than right accumulator (ps < .001), 
except in the low error cost accuracy condition (p = .23), consistent with more frequent don't-
know responses for right than left targets. In the high error-cost condition there was no 
support for a difference between speed and accuracy in DK for either the left (p = .15) or 
right (p = .45) accumulators. For the low error-cost, DK for the left accumulator was larger 
for speed than accuracy (p < .001) and vice versa for the right accumulator (p < .001). 
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Figure 7. Threshold estimates with 95% credible intervals for left and right accumulators in 
accuracy conditions (a) DK for high error cost (b) DK for low error cost, (c) B for high error 
cost and (d) B for low error cost. 








Figure 7c and 7d show that for the choice threshold the largest effect was a much 
higher value under accuracy than speed instructions, as expected (ps < .001). There was a 
weaker but reliable tendency for a bias to left responses (i.e., a lower threshold for the left 
accumulator) (ps < .001) except in the low error-cost speed condition (p = .21). Choice 
thresholds were also much higher under low than high error cost (ps < .001), consistent with 
faster RT in the latter condition. 
Figure 8 shows that mean rates were always higher for matching than mismatching 
accumulators (ps < .001), and that the difference between them was clearly greater in the 
accuracy than speed instructions (ps < .001) except in the low error-cost condition for lower 
similarity pairs where the same trend was present but weaker (p = .29). This was mainly due 
to the match rate being clearly less in speed than accuracy (ps < .01), with mismatch accuracy 
greater than speed in low error cost for both high and low similarity (p < .01), whereas there 
was a weak trend in the opposite direction for high error costs for both high (p = .1) and low 
(p = .4) similarity pairs. Figure 8 also shows no evidence for an effect of pair similarity on 
rates, consistent with the lack of effect of this factor on observed response probability and 
RT. 
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Figure 8. Mean rate (v) estimates with 95% credible intervals for matching and mismatching 
accumulators for low and high similarity pairs in (a) … (d) low/high error cost x speed vs. 
accuracy emphasis. 









The MTR model provided an accurate account of most aspects of Experiment 1, 
including the marked level of individual differences in don’t-know use. These differences 
correspond directly to the model’s DK parameter, which quantifies the proportion of the 
region under the choice threshold that produces a don't-know response when that accumulator 
is the loser. Although not as strong, there was also a relationship between the difference in 
DK between accumulators and the differences between the frequency of don't-know 
responses when targets were on the left vs. when targets were on the right. The MTR model 
was not only able to account for most effects on don’t-know frequency but also for effects on 
don’t-know RT, such as overall slower don't-know responses under high than low error cost 
and the interaction between speed-accuracy and high-low cost conditions on don’t-know 
response speed. These manipulation effects were explained by a simple pattern of effects on 
DK parameters; in all cases larger DK for high than low error cost, and in most cases larger 
DK for the left than right accumulator. There was no evidence for a difference in DK as a 
function of speed vs. accuracy emphasis when error cost was high, whereas when error cost 
was low it interacted with the left-right difference, which largely disappeared under accuracy 
emphasis. 
The only somewhat unsatisfactory aspect of the model’s fit to don't-know response 
probability was an inability to account for an interaction between pair similarity and the 
increase from low to high cost, which was greater for lower similarity pairs than for higher 
similarity pairs (~ 10% vs. 6%) whereas the model estimated the same difference (~8%, see 
Figure 4b vs 4c). It is conceivable that this difference occurred because the greater similarity 
of higher than lower similarity pairs may be immediately obvious (e.g., compare Figures 2b 
and 2c), allowing participants sufficient time to set different don't-know thresholds for these 








two types of pairs. In a related example, Provost and Heathcote (2015) found that in a mental 
rotation task requiring a matching decision about whether one image is a rotated version of 
another image presented next to it, participants set different LBA thresholds depending on the 
degree of rotation, which could be easily assessed regardless of whether or not the images 
matched. In the present data, models where don't-know thresholds were allowed to differ 
with similarity did improve fit but were not favoured by the DIC model selection criterion 
(Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin & van der Linde, 2002) in both low (9960 vs. 9890 for the model 
with differing thresholds and high (10728 vs. 10678) error-cost conditions (lower values of 
DIC indicate a better trade-off between goodness-of-fit and model complexity). 
Apart from the small interaction just described, pair similarity did not appear to have 
any effect either in manifest performance measures or in MTR parameters. Although it was 
anticipated that discounting of features shared between pair members would have some 
protective effect against the deleterious effects of increased pair similarity the finding that it 
completely removed the effect was unexpected. Unfortunately, this lack of effect, and the 
possibility that participants may be able to adjust don't-know thresholds as a function of 
similarity, meant that Experiment 1 did not afford as strong a test of the MTR model as 
hoped. Experiment 2 remedies both of these shortcomings. Because test items are presented 
one at a time it is not plausible that participants could set different don't-know thresholds for 
high and low similarity lures. As we now show, testing single items also resulted in lure 
similarity having a very large effect on performance, so together these two attributes afforded 
an even stronger test of the MTR model than Experiment 1. 











56 participants were run in order to fulfil (after exclusions described in the results 
section) our aim of 24 participants in each between-subject condition. All attended a single 
one-hour session, working singly or in pairs in separate carrels, and were University of 
Tasmania students completing either first- or second-year psychology courses; as well as a 
parent of one of the student volunteers who wished to participate. Ages in years ranged from 
18 to 66. The final sample had 20 participants who were administered the speed condition 
first (36 assigned to accuracy first), and 26 participants who were administered with left 
keys= target (30 assigned with right key = target). Consent and ethical procedures were as for 
Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as for Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. The 
test list consisted of 25 lone faces presented in a random order. The test items consisted of 12 
targets, 6 lower-similarity lures and 6 higher-similarity lures randomly selected to match the 
middle 24 study items and one target drawn from the remainder of the study list. Participants 
pressed the “z” key to indicate that a target and the “/” key to indicate a lure, or vice versa, 
with the key mapping alternated for each new participant in the experiment.           
Results 
Four participants were excluded because they had fewer than 4% DK responses 
(0.7%3.8%), three participants were excluded because, within either speed or accuracy 








blocks, or both, the error rate was greater than 60%. One participant who failed to respond on 
36% of trials was also excluded. The remaining 48 participants failed to respond on 0.4% of 
trials on average and had fast outlying responses less than 0.4s, which were removed from 
further analysis, on 0.96% of trials. 
Analysis methods were the same as for Experiment 1. Because lure similarity had a 
strong effect, for brevity we refer to low and high similarity lures as easy and hard stimuli 
respectively.  In the course of our preliminary analysis we realized that participants were 
using don't-know responses differently depending on their current game score. Recall that in 
order to maintain motivation we did not allow scores to go below zero, meaning it is no 
longer necessary to use the don’t-know response to protect against losing points. In 
Experiment 1 this virtually never happened because overall performance was fairly accurate 
but Experiment 2 was much more difficult. Consequently, their score frequently fell to zero 
or close to zero, and it was clear that don't-know use was then reduced, particularly in the 
high error-cost condition. Further, at a score of 100 points or less there is no difference 
between the high and low error-cost conditions, in that the same amount was lost for an error 
in both. We therefore created a factor that divided trials into low (100 points or less) and high 
scores. With this cut-off 38% of trials had low scores overall (51% for high error cost and 
25% for low error cost). We included the score factor in our analysis of response probability 
and men RT and into the MTR parameter specification for the don't-know threshold, 
instantiating the assumption that score had a simple selectively influence. 








As for Experiment 1, the MTR model had 19 parameters in total3. As in Experiment 
1, there were four choice threshold (b) parameters (estimated as B), one for the old and one 
for the new response accumulator separately for the speed condition and for the accuracy 
condition. Don’t-know thresholds were estimated as a proportion of the choice threshold (i.e., 
we estimated 1-DK directly), with these proportions allowed to vary over score and response. 
This meant that there were 4 estimated relative-threshold parameters which give 8 different d 
threshold values, since the model estimates separate threshold heights for b under 
speed/accuracy emphasis.  There was one start-point noise (A) and one non-decision time (t0) 
parameter. The sv parameter for the mismatching accumulator was fixed at 1 for each 
stimulus type (easy or hard lures and targets) and estimated for the matching accumulator for 
each stimulus type. There were 6 mean rate parameters, half for the matching and half for the 





3 We also explored models with more parameters and found one with 29 parameters that was 
preferred by DIC, but which did not provide a noticeably better description of the data than the 
simpler model. We report details of the more complex model in supplementary materials. 
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Figure 9. (a) and (b): Observed vs. fitted don't-know probability for low-score trials (grey 
letters) and high-score trials (black letters). Letters correspond to participants: a ... x for 
participants in the high error-cost condition and A … X for participants in the low error-cost 
condition. (c) and (d) observed and fitted differences between high and low score trials 
results. 
For details of sampling methods and priors see supplementary materials, with data 
files and R code to fit the models are available at osf.io/6h4qe/. In supplementary materials 
we plot the global fit of the model to all conditions, both in terms of RT distribution (as 
represented by the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles and cumulative distribution functions) and 
response probability. As for Experiment 1, these plots demonstrate the model provides an 
accurate description of the data. 
Figures 9a and 9b show that we again observed very large individual differences in 
don’t-know use, which was on average greater for high than low error cost, and that the MTR 
model was again able to accommodate these findings. Figures 9c and 9d show that for almost 
all participants in the high error-cost condition, and for many in the low error-cost condition, 








don't-know use was much more frequent when the score was high, although in one case 
(participant “x”) this was reversed. 
Figure 10 shows that on average the probability of a don't-know response was 
reduced when the error cost, c2(1) = 13.4, p < .001, or score, c2(1) = 95, p < .001, were low, 
and also for target test items compared to easy and hard lures, c2(2) = 216, p < .001, which 
had almost identical don't-know probabilities. No other effects on don't-know probability 
were significant. The model captured these results fairly well, except for under-predicting 
high error cost in Figure 10a and the magnitude of the lure vs. target difference in Figure 10c. 
No other effects on don't-know probability were significant, including speed vs. accuracy 
emphasis, as shown in Figure 10d. Figure 10c shows a substantial effect of lure similarity on 
accuracy; accuracy was barely above chance for hard lures (52.9%), intermediate for easy 
lures (65.5%) and best for targets (74.2%), c2(2) = 326, p < .001. As shown in Figure 10d, 
there were also more correct responses under accuracy emphasis (69.4%) than speed 
emphasis (66.5%), c2(1) = 9.2, p = .002. Both effects were well captured by the model. No 
other effects on the accuracy of definitive responses were significant. 
























Figure 10. Response probability for data (open symbols with 95% confidence intervals) and 
fits (closed symbols joined by lines) as a function of response type and (a) error cost, (b) 
score, (c) stimulus and (d) speed vs. accuracy emphasis. 
 











                                         (b)                                                    (c) 
Figure 11. Mean RT for data (open symbols with 95% confidence intervals) and fits (closed 
symbols joined by lines). Results as a function of response: (a) broken by speed vs. accuracy 
emphasis for each stimulus and (b) broken down by error cost. (c) Results as a function of 
score broken down by speed vs. accuracy emphasis. 
Mean RT  was faster in speed than accuracy emphasis by ~0.26s, c2(1) = 4325, p < 
.001, target responses were faster than lure and don't-know responses by ~0.13s, c2(2) = 942, 
p < .001, responses to targets were faster than responses to lures by ~0.06s, c2(1) = 27.2, p < 
.001, and low-score trial responses were faster than high-score trial response by ~0.03s, c2(1) 
= 16, p < .001. Figure 11a shows that there was a significant three-way interaction in mean 








RT between response, stimulus and speed vs. accuracy, c2(4) = 31.9, p < .001 (all constituent 
two-way interactions were also significant). For don’t-know responses the emphasis effect 
was larger for targets than lures by ~ 0.05s. For lure responses it was smaller for easy lures 
than hard lures and targets by ~0.6s. For target responses it was smallest for targets by ~0.08s 
from hard lures and was bigger again by ~0.04s for easy lures. As shown in Figure 11b, there 
was an interaction between error cost and response, c2(1) = 40.9, p < .001, with slowing for 
high over low cost for definitive response by ~0.05s on average, but speeding for don't-know 
responses, again by ~0.05s. Finally, as shown in Figure 11c, there was a small two-way 
interaction due to a larger emphasis effect for low than high score trials by ~0.03s, c2(1) = 
15.6, p < .001. No other effects were significant. The model did a good job of 
accommodating all of these effects except the later small two-way interaction. 
Model Parameters 
Once again, we focus on the mean rates (v), choice thresholds (b) and DK in this 
section, with results for the remaining parameters presented in supplementary materials. 
Figures 12a and 12b show the association between DK and the probability of a don’t-
know response. As for Experiment 1 there was a strong linear relationship with a slope close 
to two for both high error cost (slope = 1.9, r2 = .99, p < .001) and low error cost (slope = 
1.83, r2 = .97, p < .001). As shown in Figures 12c and 12d, the same type of strong linear 
relationship held between the difference in don't-know probability between high and low 
trials for both high error cost (slope = 2.2, r2 = .96, p < .001) and low error cost (slope = 2.1, 
r2 = .87, p < .001) conditions. 









(a)      (b) 
 
(c)     (d) 
Figure 12. Observed probability of a don't-know responses for low-score (grey letters) and 
high-score (black letters) trials as a function of the average of DK estimates over lure and 
target accumulators. (c) and (d): Observed probability of the different between don't-know 
responses for high and low score trials as a function of the difference in DK estimates 
between right and left accumulators. Letters a ... x correspond to participants in the high 
error-cost condition and A … X to participants in the low error-cost condition. 
 













(c)     (d) 
 
Figure 13. Threshold estimates with 95% credible intervals for lure and target accumulators. 
(a) – (b) DK estimates; (c) and (d) choice threshold B estimates.  
Figure 13 shows that DK estimates in the high error-cost condition were larger for 
high than low score trials (ps < .001). DK estimates are smaller when on a Low Score than a 
high score, with a bigger difference in the High Error cost condition. Lure DK estimates were 








much bigger than target DK estimates, suggesting that responses that resulted in the lure 
accumulator winning the choice race rarely became don’t know responses. 
Choice threshold estimates were greater under accuracy than speed emphasis (ps < 
.001) and were greater for the lure than target accumulator (ps < .001). The difference 
between target and lure is bigger in the Accuracy emphasis condition. 
Figure 14 shows that in most cases the match-accumulator rate was greater than the 
mismatch-accumulator rate (ps < .001), except for hard lures in the high error cost condition. 
Target stimulus had the biggest matching drift rate, smallest mismatching drift rate and 
subsequently the biggest difference between match and mismatching accumulators (ps<.001).  
Easy lure stimulus trials had bigger matching and smaller mismatching mean drift rates than 
hard lure stimulus (ps<.01). The difference between match and mismatching accumulators is 
biggest on target accumulators in the high error cost condition, and bigger for lure stimulus in 
the low error cost condition.   
 
 
       (a)                          (b) 
Figure 14. Mean rate (v) estimates with 95% credible intervals for matching and mismatching 
accumulators for easy and hard lures and target stimulus trials. 









As for the two-alternative forced choice performance in Experiment 1, the MTR 
model provided a quite accurate account of most aspects of single-item recognition in 
Experiment 2. Once again there were marked individual differences in don't-know use that 
had a direct relationship with the MTR’s average DK parameter, which corresponded to 
about half of a participant’s probability of a don’t-know response. There were also more 
subtle and varied effects of the within- and between-participant manipulations on DK 
estimates, which were generally larger when the cost of an error was greater and larger for 
the lure than target accumulator. 
Just as in Experiment 1, larger DK values when there was a high error cost translated 
into more frequent don't-know use. Greater difficulty in Experiment 2 meant that participants 
had very low scores on half of the high error-cost trials and one quarter of the low error-cost 
trials, and for most participants this was associated with decreased don't-know use. The MTR 
model was able to accommodate this effect by a simple reduction in DK for the lower-score 
trials. There was also a clear 1:2 relationship between DK estimates and don't-know response 
probability for lower minus higher error-score trials that explained individual differences in 
the effect of score, including reversals of the usual pattern for some participants. This strong 
and direct relationship contrasts with the less direct relationship between DK estimates and 
the probability of don't-know responses for left vs. right targets in Experiment 1, which 
would be expected to be weaker because there is only a partial correspondence between 
target side and the accumulator that determines whether a definitive or don't-know response 
is made. 
These findings, and those for individual differences in the effect of target side in 
Experiment 1, illustrate that although it is sometimes possible for some manipulations and 








individual differences to obtain approximate estimates of DK from don't-know response 
probability, a full fit of the MTR model can be required in order to evaluate how DK values 
change for other effects. 
In contrast to Experiment 1, the similarity manipulation in Experiment 2 was 
successful, with lower (indeed, close to chance) accuracy for lures that were highly similar to 
studied items relative to lures that were less similar. Although don’t-know use did not differ 
between easy and hard lures, it was higher for lures than for targets, which produced faster 
and more accurate responses than lures. The MTR model was able to accommodate this 
pattern of don't-know use, but it slightly under-predicted the lure-target difference. Greater 
don't-know use on target stimulus trials was predicted even though the model predicts that 
DK was much bigger on the lure accumulator than the target accumulator, implying that most 
don’t know responses would have been target responses. This means that most don’t know 
responses on target stimulus trials would have been correctly identified, and that most don’t 
know responses on lure stimulus trials would have been errors. With the don’t know 
responses being predicted mainly from one response, the model is not able to fully explain 
the difference in don’t know use by stimulus. 
 Once again this illustrates that don't-know use is governed not only by the strategic 
factors that determine the setting of evidence thresholds, but also by other factors, such as 
those associated with the stimuli on which choices are based. 
As expected, accuracy in the speed emphasis condition decreased because both choice 
thresholds were lower. In the supplementary materials we include a more complex fit that 
also allows the drift rates to vary by the speed emphasis condition, which predicts a reduction 
in evidence quality in addition to the lower thresholds. 
We also found two types of bias: response bias, which is mediated by choice 
thresholds, and stimulus bias, which affects evidence accumulation rates (e.g., Leite & 








Ratcliff, 2011; Osth, Dennis & Heathcote, 2017; White & Poldrack, 2014). First, for choice 
thresholds there was a consistent response bias towards target responses (i.e., lower choice 
thresholds for the target than lure accumulator) that was larger under accuracy than speed 
emphasis. There was also a stimulus bias towards old responses which was so extreme in the 
high error cost condition, that a hard stimulus provided a bigger drift rate for target responses 
than lure responses on average.  
In summary, since the hard lures were highly similar to target responses, there was 
both a stimulus bias and a threshold bias towards identifying the stimulus as a target. 
However, since DK was much larger on lure than the target accumulator, if a target response 
was not a clear winner, it would become a don’t know response instead. That participants are 
so adept in taking advantage of the flexibility afforded by the availability of a don't-know 
response option suggests that the strategy of deciding not to choose is one that they have 
experience with because of its utility in dealing with difficult choices. 
General Discussion 
In this paper we proposed a theory of what have been variously called “equivocal”, 
“uncertain”, “opt-out”—and in our terminology “don't-know”—responses as a third option 
when faced with a decision as to which of two choices is correct. We instantiated the theory 
in a dynamic evidence-accumulation model, the Multiple Threshold Race (MTR), that can 
explain how often each of the three possible responses is made and the distribution of 
corresponding RTs. Don’t-know responses have been shown to be used adaptively when 
humans and other higher mammals (Shields, Smith & Washburn, 1997; Smith et al., 1995) 
are faced with difficult choices and to improve performance with line-ups in eyewitness 
memory (Weber & Prefect, 2012). We also found that our participants were adept at the use 
of don't-know responses.  








We applied the MTR to recognition memory paradigm with face stimuli where the 
decisions were difficult because of a high degree of similarity between faces that had 
(targets) and had not (lures) been previously studied. We found adaptive behaviour in the 
sense that participants strategically avoided a loss of points associated with an error by 
making a no-penalty don't-know response. They did so when the level of error cost was 
constant across the entire experiment and, displaying flexibility that we had not anticipated, 
they also modulated don't-know use on a trial-by-trial basis when their error cost decreased 
because their points tally was low and could not decrease below zero. We also found that the 
availability of don't-know responses enabled participants to adapt to instructions emphasising 
either the speed or accuracy of responses in order to deal with one choice stimulus (lures) 
being particularly difficult. They did this via coordinated changes in not only the threshold 
controlling the level of don't-know responding but also by modulating two other aspects of 
the decision process: response bias and stimulus bias (White & Poldrack, 2014). 
These findings add to a growing catalogue of examples (e.g., Palada et al., 2016, 
2018, in press; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998) where participants strategically modulate a variety 
of aspects of the evidence-accumulation process in order to cope with difficult decisions. As 
in these other examples, we found that a model based on the idea of evidence-accumulation 
to a choice threshold provided both a good descriptive account of the probability and speed of 
definitive choices when faced with such challenging choices. By simple addition of an extra 
don't-know threshold to the evidence accumulators corresponding to each binary choice we 
were able to extend this framework to provide a good description of the probability and speed 
of don't-know responses. As was also the case in the other examples, the parameters of the 
extended model provide insights into the psychological mechanisms by which participants 
managed the demands of a difficult choice scenario that would not be possible by examining 
only their observed behaviour. These insights reinforced the case for increased study of how 








decisions use don't-know responses and potentially for greater use of don't-know responses in 
decision making applications given the apparent flexibility and adaptability with which they 
were used by our participants (see also Weber & Perfect, 2013). 
In the past, allowing don't-know responses has not been favoured for two reasons. 
The first is a high level of individual differences in their uptake, which has the potential to 
add noise that obscures measurement of the underlying ability to make an accurate choice. 
We also found very marked individual differences. Some participants made little use of don't-
know responses despite being shown that their decisions were highly error prone and being 
encouraged to use them as a means to avoid penalties associated with errors. Other 
participants used them so often that they missed opportunities where they would have likely 
been rewarded for making a correct response. However, the MTR was able to accurately 
accommodate these differences in terms of the position of the additional don’t-know 
threshold. Unexpectedly we found a very simple relationship, whereby an individual’s 
probability of making a don't-know response corresponded to half of the average proportion 
of the region under the choice threshold above the don't-know threshold. This relationship 
also extended to modulations of the don't-know threshold for low vs. high scores, but for 
other effects, such as the difference between targets presented on the left vs. right of a two-
alternative forced choice and the effect of speed vs. accuracy emphasis, the relationship was 
more complex so that fitting of the MTR model was required. 
The second reason against allowing don't-know responses is the conviction that 
forcing participants to make a binary choice is more informative about a participant’s ability. 
Watson et al. (1973) presented empirical evidence against this contention in the context of 
static signal detection theory of response probabilities. They showed that the same measures 
of discrimination ability were obtained as when making a binary choice, as well as 
accommodating individual differences, by simply estimating an additional response criterion. 








We took a similar approach but added two thresholds to provide an account of both RT and 
choice probability. In supplemental materials we demonstrate that the MTR models we 
reported here had good measurement properties in the sense that they provided accurate and 
precise parameter estimates when fit to simulated data for the same designs as used in our 
experiments. These results suggest that, by using the full information available in response 
probabilities and RT, the MTR model is able to provide valid and informative estimates of 
not only the extra thresholds but all of the other model parameters that provide a rich and 
informative characterization of the psychological process of decision making.  
However, we also show in supplemental materials that this may not always be the 
case. In particular, we found in the design used in Experiment 1 that if we allowed extra 
flexibility by estimating different rates for stimuli with different target locations, parameter 
recovery failed due to extreme tradeoffs between rate and don't-know threshold parameters 
whereby don't-know thresholds for one accumulator were reduced to zero. This appears to be 
a result of uncertainty intrinsic to the MTR about which accumulator’s choice threshold 
triggers a don't-know response. Hence, we advise that applications of the MTR (and indeed 
any cognitive model) be accompanied by a parameter-recovery study (Heathcote, Brown & 
Wagenmakers, 2015; Heathcote et al., 2018). The need for this check is reinforced by an 
examination, detailed in supplementary materials, if how adding a don't-know threshold 
affected measurement of other model parameters. This examination revealed that when 
response biases exist (such as in the first experiment), there can be regions of unidentifiable 
parameters, particularly in complex models. In particular, when the drift rates vary by 
stimulus type and thresholds by accumulator in the design of Experiment 1, non-identifiable 
regions are created, with the don’t-know thresholds becoming biased towards one response. 
This creates cases were the true direction of the rate and threshold biases can flip in 
parameter recovery. However, this does not occur when drift rates do not vary with stimulus, 








as was assumed in the model we reported. In the Experiment 2 design, there were no 
problems even in a more flexible model where drift rates varied with stimulus and thresholds 
with accumulator. This was likely the case because the large differences in accuracy and RT 
between stimulus types in Experiment 2. 
Future Directions 
Higham (2007) showed that the optimal level of don't-know use on the Scholastic 
Aptitude Test (a multiple-choice test with formula scoring) could be determined based an 
equal variance version of Type-1 and Type-2 signal detection theory. Because the MTR is a 
fully specified quantitative model it also enables investigation of optimality, as has been done 
with standard evidence accumulation models (e.g., Bogacz et al., 2006; Garton, Reynolds, 
Hinder & Heathcote, 2019, Starns & Ratcliff, 2010). Following the methodology developed 
by Garton et al., all parameters could be fixed at their estimated values while the don't-know 
threshold is varied in order to identify the optimum setting (and hence level of don't-know 
use) relative to a given payoff scheme or other loss function. This approach moves beyond 
previous work by taking into account RT when addressing the question of what an optimal 
level of don't-know use. 
Although the version of MTR we applied here was largely successful, alternative 
versions are plausible and may be required in other paradigms. For example, in some 
circumstances it might be better to decide using a “threshold counting” rule, such as 
responding as soon as any two thresholds have been crossed. In that case, a don't-know 
response would be associated with crossing of the two lower thresholds first. Such a rule may 
be useful because accumulating more evidence to the top threshold slows responding but 
doesn’t change the outcome (a don’t-know response) once the two lower thresholds have 
crossed. As this rule results in faster don't-know responses than the rule we assumed here it 








may be more suitable in cases such as the game-show scenario described in the introduction, 
where don’t-know responses have utility only when they result in an opportunity to answer 
more questions in a fixed time.  
The intuition behind why both rules capture uncertainty is the same; don't-know 
responses are associated with smaller differences between evidence totals. However, the 
alternative threshold-count rule represents a more radical departure from Vickers’ (1979) 
Balance of Evidence hypothesis, which shares with the rule assumed here the assumption that 
only one threshold in each accumulator can trigger a response. It would seem desirable in 
future work to compare these two approaches, and other possibilities, such as a direct 
influence of knowledge of how long it takes to make each decision so as to terminate slow 
decisions (Kiani & Shadlen, 2009, Malhotra, Leslie, Ludwig & Bogacz, 2017). A promising 
process account of the latter type is to add to the usual binary evidence accumulation process 
a third process (see Hawkins & Heathcote, submitted) that measures the passage of time 
(which itself could be an accumulation process, see Simen, 2016). If the third process wins 
then a don't-know response is made, with the speed of the third timing processes determining 
the speed of don't-know responses. This approach can improve accuracy, but only if errors 
are usually slower than correct responses, so it remains to be seen if it is able to provide a 
better account than the MTR model under circumstances that require speeded responding, as 
it is just such circumstances that are usually associated with faster errors. 
The idea of a time-out has been used to account for response deferral in the realm of 
value-based or preferential choices (Bhatia & Mullett, 2016; Jessup, Veinott, Todd & 
Busemeyer, 2009). Unlike the choices studied here, no preferential response is necessarily 
correct (e.g., choosing which movie to watch). Tversky and Shafir (1993) found that 
deferring such choices is made more likely when choice conflict is increased by enlarging or 
improving the choice set. Jessup et al. considered explanations of effects on deferral of 








enlarging the choice set based on Decision Field Theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) in 
terms of three mechanism, an explicit deferral response, deferral based on a criterion number 
of changes in the choice with the most evidence, and deferral responses being triggered by a 
time limit. The latter time-out mechanism, in combination with in Bhatia’s (2013) associative 
accumulation model (AAM), was found by Bhatia and Mullett to provide a comprehensive 
explanation of various ways in which deferral is affected by conflict among different 
attributes of multiple-attribute options, and of two effects related to deferral speed, slower 
deferral than definitive choices and slowing in definitive choices when a deferral response is 
allowed compared to when it is not allowed. The latter effects arise because slower potential 
definitive choices tie out and become deferrals, so the definitive choices that are actually 
made tend to be faster.  
If deferral were explained in the same way as don’t know responses, then the MTR 
also predicts slower deferred than definitive responses, since responses where the losing 
accumulator has more evidence will occur more often when the winning accumulator is 
slower than average4. It also predicts, all things being equal, that definitive choices are faster 
when don’t know or deferral responses are an option than when they are not, again because 
deferring or responding don’t know removes what would otherwise have been slower 
definitive responses. It differs from the time-out account in that the possibility of deferral 




4 Lowering the intermediate threshold will make don’t know responses more frequent and faster on average, 
however it would also have the effect of making the remaining definitive responses faster again. A partial 
exception can occur if the intermediate threshold differs between accumulators. For example, if it is lower for 
the left than right accumulator, then would-be right responses are more likely to become don’t know 
responses. This will reduce the relative number of right responses compared to left responses. If, in addition, 
there is also a rate bias towards right responses, so that right responses are faster than left responses, it is 
possible that the don’t know responses can be faster than the definitive left responses. 








on the choice threshold, whereas speed increases in the time-out account because time-out 
responses are at least as fast, and sometimes faster, than the definitive responses they replace. 
Future research might compare accuracy-based choice with and without don’t know or 
deferral to see if the same slowing occurs as with preferential choice. Both in these 
experiments, and preferential choice experiments, the contrasting time-out and MTR 
predictions about overall aggregated speed might be compared.  
Both mechanisms would be challenged by cases in which non-definitive responses 
have utility only if they are faster than definitive responses, as was suggested with respect to 
the game-show scenario discussed previously, perhaps necessitating something like the 
threshold-counting mechanism, although the time-out mechanism would still have utility due 
to it increasing aggregate speed. Another case in which time-outs might be preferable 
concerns is when non-definitive responses are made in response to the absolute rather than 
relative level of evidence.  
White, Hoffrage and Reisen (2015) discuss both absolute and relative bases for 
deferring decisions in the context of preferential choice, either that no choice is good enough 
or uncertainty regarding which is the best. Their two-stage two-threshold model suggests that 
deferral can arise either during an initial absolute-evaluation stage (if no options are good 
enough) or during a subsequent relative evaluation stage (if good enough options cannot be 
discriminated). An absolute basis is less common in the accuracy-based decisions that we 
addressed here but does arise with respect to optional choice in eyewitness-memory research. 
For example, Clark’s (2003) WITNESS model holds that identification decisions involve 
assessments of both absolute similarity (the extent to which the best matching lineup matches 
the witness’ memory of the culprit) and relative similarity (the extent to which the best 
matching lineup member is favoured over the other lineup members). For a lineup member to 
be identified, criterion levels of both absolute match and relative superiority must be met. 








Thus, an entire lineup may be rejected because no member sufficiently matches the witness’s 
memory of the perpetrator in an absolute sense, or, when two or more members pass the 
absolute criterion and cannot be differentiated. The MTR model naturally addresses the 
relative basis but may not be sufficient for the absolute basis. In contrast the time-out 
mechanism is sensitive to the absolute level of evidence (i.e., if all options are weak none 
may accrue the required amount of evidence sufficiently quickly). Future research may 
manipulate the levels of absolute and relative evidence in optional choice to see if one or 
other mechanism, or both, or White et al.’s sequential absolute-then-relative mechanism, is 
favoured. 
Unlike time-out models (at least without augmentation) the MTR framework can be 
easily extended to account for another response associated with uncertainty, multiple 
confidence ratings, which in contrast to don't-know responses have been studied intensively 
and have a range of recognized benchmark phenomena (e.g., Moran, Teodorescu & Usher, 
2015). Changing the response rule in the architecture examined here, with two thresholds per 
accumulator, can accommodate high vs. low confidence ratings for each choice, as the 
likelihood for don't-know responses is simply the sum of the likelihoods corresponding to 
low confidence choices. More confidence ratings can be accommodated in the same way by 
adding extra thresholds. A similar extension is also straightforward with the threshold-
counting version of the MTR. These extensions are most tractable when the choice and 
confidence rating are made simultaneously (Ratcliff & Starns, 2009, 2013) but given that 
multiple-threshold models have been used to model sequential decisions (Van Zandt & 
Maldonado-Molina, 2004) there is also potential to develop MTR models that address choice-
followed-by-confidence-ratings paradigms (Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010).  
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